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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, with the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick presiding, entered an order denying defendant's/appellant's Motion to 
Enforce Settlement Agreement on October 16, 1995. The order was timely appealed by the 
filing of a Notice of Appeal on November 15, 1995. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Trial Court properly denied defendant's/appellant's motion to 
enforce a settlement agreement where two of the four plaintiffs/appellees accepted the 
settlement offer unconditionally and where the other two plaintiffs/appellees (the wives of the 
other two plaintiffs/appellees) first claimed that they had not consented to the settlement four 
months after the settlement offer was unconditionally accepted in writing by their attorney 
and after defendant had performed his duties in reliance upon the unconditional acceptance. 
Because the facts relating to this issue are not in material dispute, the issue 
arises from the Trial Court's application of the law to the undisputed facts. Issues of law 
have a "correction of error" standard where no particular deference is accorded to the Trial 
Court's conclusion. Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Savings and Loan Association, 
739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah App. 1987); Schroder v. Horack, 592 S.W.2d 742, 744 (MO. 
1979); Cooper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah App. 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
None. The only determinative law is case law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a dispute regarding the enforceability of a settlement agreement 
between a defendant/appellant Val E. Southwick ("Southwick") and the plaintiffs/appellees 
Lawrence C. Kay, Joy Kay, Robert L. Kay, and Teresa Kay (the "Kays"). On October 16, 
1995, Judge J. Dennis Frederick of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
entered an Order Denying Val E. Southwick's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. On 
November 15, 1995, Southwick filed this appeal. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. In December of 1993, judgment was entered against Southwick and 
others in favor of the Kays. (R. at 1980-1983) 
2. On March 16, 1995, Southwick, through his attorney, transmitted a 
written settlement offer by facsimile to the Kays' attorney. (R. at 2655 and 2670) 
(Addendum B, Exhibit A) (Addendum C, p. 2) 
3. Within 30 minutes after the written offer was transmitted, Southwick 
informed his attorney that he could increase the amount of the offer to $10,200.00. A new 
written settlement offer was transmitted via facsimile by Southwick's attorney to the Kays' 
attorney on March 16, 1995. (R. at 2656 and 2670) (Addendum B, Exhibit B) (Addendum C, 
p. 2) 
4. On April 7, 1995, the Kays' attorney mailed a written, unconditional 
acceptance of the offer to settle for $10,200.00. (R. at 2658 and 2670) (Addendum B, 
Exhibit C) (Addendum C, p.2) 
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5. In reliance upon the settlement agreement created by the acceptance of 
the Southwick's offer, Southwick transferred the full settlement funds into his attorney's trust 
account and directed his attorney to prepare a written Settlement and Release Agreement (the 
"Agreement"). (R. at 2651, 2670-2671) (Addendum B, p. 2) (Addendum C, pp. 2-3) 
6. On April 18, 1995, the Agreement was mailed to the Kays' attorney 
(R. at 2658-2662) (Addendum B, Exhibit D) 
7. On May 9, 1995, Southwick's attorney spoke to the Kays' attorney by 
telephone to inquire as to the status of the Agreement. The Kays' attorney told Southwick's 
attorney that he was satisfied with the language contained therein and sent it to his clients for 
their signatures. (R. at 2671) (Addendum C, p. 3) 
8. On May 23, 1995, Southwick's attorney left a telephone message with 
the Kays' attorney inquiring as to whether the Agreement was fully executed. (R. at 2671) 
(Addendum C, p. 3) 
9. On June 20, 1995, Southwick's attorney spoke with the Kays' attorney 
regarding the status of the Agreement. The Kays' attorney stated that his clients may have 
changed their minds with respect to settlement. Southwick's attorney told the Kays' attorney 
that he should tell the Kays that Southwick's attorney did not believe the Kays could change 
their mind at this point and Southwick's attorney would file a motion to enforce the 
agreement if they did not sign and return the Agreement. (R. at 2671) (Addendum C, p. 3) 
10. On July 11, 1995, Southwick's attorney mailed written notice to the 
Kays' attorney informing him that if the Agreement was not signed and returned by July 21, 
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1995, a motion would be filed to enforce the Agreement. (R. at 2671-2672) (Addendum B, 
Exhibit E) (Addendum C, pp. 3-4) 
11. On August 2, 1995, Southwick's attorney filed a Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement, a memorandum in support thereof and an attorney's affidavit (R. at 
2648-2682) (Addenda A, B and C) 
12. On August 15, 1995, the Kays' attorney filed a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion and two affidavits in support thereof. (R. at 2685-2691 and 2697-
2698) (Addenda D, E and F) 
13. On August 21, 1995, Southwick's attorney filed a reply to the Kays' 
opposition to the motion. (R. at 2692-2696) (Addendum G) 
14. On August 28, 1995, the Kays' attorney filed a supplemental 
memorandum to the opposition to the motion. (R. at 2704-2706) (Addendum H) 
15. On August 30, 1995, Southwick's attorney filed a response to the 
supplemental memorandum. (R. at 2701-2703) (Addendum I) 
16. On September 12, 1995, the Trial Court entered a Minute Entry which 
denied the motion "FOR REASONS SPECIFIED IN OPPOSING MEMORANDA." (R. at 
2707-2708) (Addendum J) 
17. On October 16, 1995, the Trial Court entered the Order denying the 
motion. (R. at 2709-2710) (Addendum K) 
18. On November 15, 1995, Southwick's attorney filed the Notice of 
Appeal. (R. at 2711-2712) (Addendum L) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred in denying Southwick's Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement. The Kays, through their attorney, unconditionally accepted Southwick's written 
settlement offer. In reliance upon this acceptance, Southwick performed his duties by 
transferring settlement funds to his attorney's trust account and by directing his attorney to 
prepare and deliver the Agreement to the Kays. Approximately 20 days thereafter, the Kays' 
attorney told Southwick's attorney that the Agreement looked fine and he expected to receive 
the signed original from his clients shortly. Approximately 40 days later, the Kays' attorney 
told Southwick's attorney that he thought his clients were changing their minds about settling 
with Southwick. Approximately two months thereafter, Southwick first learned that instead 
of changing their minds, two of the four Kays (the two wives of the other two Kays) claimed 
to have never consented to settling with Southwick. (R. at 2685) (Addendum D, p. 1) 
Because two of the Kays undoubtedly accepted the offer to settle; because the 
other two Kays permitted Southwick to rely upon their attorney's unconditional acceptance of 
the offer for over four months without lifting a finger to communicate their nonacceptance 
until being forced to do so by Southwick's motion to enforce the Agreement; and because 
Southwick did, indeed, reasonably rely upon the unconditional acceptance in performing his 
duties under the Agreement, a valid and binding settlement agreement was formed. 
Furthermore, specific performance is the only equitable remedy which applies to the Kays' 
breach of contract, the Trial Court erred in refusing to enforce the Agreement through 
specific performance. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. A Valid and Binding Settlement Agreement Was Entered Into Between 
Southwick and the Kays. 
An agreement to settle is a contract between the parties to the agreement. 15A 
Am.Jur.2d Compromise and Settlement, § 7 (1976); Zions First National Bank v. Barbara 
Jensen Interiors. Inc.. 781 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Butcher v. Gilrov. 744 P.2d 
311, 312 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Like other contracts, it requires offer, acceptance and 
consideration to formulate. Once formed, it is fully enforceable. Id,. 
In the present case, the undisputed facts demonstrate that a specific, written 
settlement offer was transmitted from Southwick to the Kays through their respective 
attorneys. (R. at 2656, 2670, 2675) (Addendum B, Exhibit B) (Addendum C, p. 2 and 
Exhibit B). The Kays' attorney spoke with Lawrence C. Kay and Robert L. Kay (the 
husbands of Joy Kay and Teresa Kay) regarding the settlement offer. Lawrence and Robert 
Kay told their attorney that they could accept the settlement offer for the Kays. (R. at 2685, 
2689-2691) (Addendum D, p. 1) (Addendum E). Accordingly, the Kays' attorney 
unconditionally accepted the settlement offer in writing on behalf of the Kays. (R. at 2658) 
(Addendum B). 
In reliance upon the unconditional acceptance of the settlement offer, 
Southwick transferred the settlement funds to his attorney's trust account and directed his 
attorney to prepare the Agreement. (R. at 2651, 2670-2671) (Addendum B, p. 2) 
(Addendum C, pp. 2-3). Shortly thereafter, Southwick's attorney transmitted the Agreement 
to the Kays' attorney. (R. at 2651, 2670) (Addendum B, p. 2) (Addendum C, pp. 2-3). The 
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Kays' attorney reviewed the Agreement, approved its terms, and forwarded the Agreement to 
the Kays for their signatures (R. at 2651, 2670-2671) (Addendum B, p. 2) (Addendum C, 
pp. 2-3). 
Approximately 40 days after the Kays received the Agreement, Southwick's 
attorney telephoned the Kays' attorney to find out why the Agreement had not been signed 
and returned. The Kays' attorney told Southwick's attorney that his clients may be changing 
their minds about settling with Southwick. (R. at 2651-2652, 2671) (Addendum B, pp. 2-3) 
(Addendum C, p. 3). 
Approximately 3 months after the Kays received the Agreement, Southwick 
learned for the very first time that instead of changing their minds, Joy Kay and Teresa Kay 
were now claiming that they had never agreed to accept the settlement offer. (R. at 2685) 
(Addendum D, p. 1). Southwick learned of this surprising claim only after the Kays were 
forced to respond to Southwick's motion to enforce the Agreement. (R. at 2685) (Addendum 
D, p. 1). 
In the Kays' opposition to the motion, they asserted that because their attorney 
could not bind them to the Agreement, and because two of the four had never accepted the 
offer, Southwick could not enforce the Agreement because there was no agreement. (R. at 
2685-2688) (Addendum D). 
The Kays were absolutely correct in asserting that their attorney's 
unconditional acceptance of the settlement offer does not unilaterally bind the Kays unless the 
Kays authorized the acceptance. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32 (1992). In 1909, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a settlement agreement cannot be enforced against parties against 
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their will or without the consent of the parties. McWhirler v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 293, 104 
P. 731, 734 (1909) (quoting Borkheim v. N.B. & M. Insurance Co., 38 Cal. 623). 
But while the Kays' attorney cannot unilaterally bind them to the Agreement, 
the Kays' own action can bind them to the Agreement. First, with respect to Lawrence and 
Robert Kay, the undisputed facts are that they not only completely and unconditionally 
accepted the settlement offer, they communicated that acceptance to their attorney in such a 
way that he believed they were speaking with authority to bind not only themselves, but their 
wives as well. There is no dispute that Lawrence and Robert Kay are bound by the 
Agreement. Absolutely no defense was offered on their behalf. 
Second, with respect to Joy and Teresa Kay, they are bound to the Agreement 
because of their actions. A contract can be formed without the express manifestation of the 
parties: "under some circumstances, silence and inaction operate as an acceptance, as where, 
under the circumstances, an inference of assent is warranted. . . . Under certain 
circumstances, the offeree may authorize or cause the offeror to regard silence as an 
acceptance. . . . " 17A Am. Jur.2d Contracts § 103 (1991). "Consent may be implied from 
acts or may be indicated by silence or inaction. Conduct may be as effective as words in 
manifesting mutual assent to a contract." 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 29 (1991). "The 
meeting of the minds, which is essential in the formation of a contract, is not determined by 
the secret intentions of the parties, but by their expressed or manifested intentions, which 
may be wholly at variance with the former." 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 28 (1991). 
For over three months after Joy and Teresa Kay were sent the original 
Agreement by their attorney to sign, they did absolutely nothing to inform their attorney or 
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Southwick that they did not accept his settlement offer, even though their own attorney had 
unconditionally accepted the offer for all of them, and their husbands had accepted the offer. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Joy and Teresa Kay did not see a copy of their attorney's letter 
accepting the offer even though it was sent to both Lawrence and Robert Kay (see the "cc" at 
the bottom of the letter found at R. 2657 and Addendum B, Exhibit C); and assuming the 
wives never discussed the settlement offer with their husbands, Joy and Teresa Kay received 
the original Agreement by May 9, 1995. (R. at 2671) (Addendum C, p. 3). If a reasonably 
prudent person who does not want to settle a judgment receives a settlement agreement from 
his or her attorney requesting that person's signature, the reasonably prudent person would 
communicate his or her intentions to the attorney. One might expect to hear the reasonably 
prudent say, "Why on earth are you asking me to sign this Agreement when I do not wish to 
settle with Southwick!" 
Furthermore, if one reasonably assumes that Joy and Teresa Kay do read the 
letters coming from their attorney or if one reasonably assumes that Joy and Teresa Kay and 
their husbands discuss major events occurring in the Southwick matter, then the complete 
silence and inaction of Joy and Teresa Kay makes no sense whatsoever. In addition, a 
reasonable person would understand that their silence and inaction in the face of the 
unconditional acceptance of the settlement offer by their attorney would cause Southwick to 
believe he had an agreement and he would begin performing thereunder. 
Because Lawrence and Robert Kay expressly accepted the offer, because Joy 
and Teresa Kay demonstrated a lack of good faith and diligence in the way they did nothing 
when it would have been so easy to communicate with their attorney, and because Southwick 
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did, indeed, perform his duties under the Agreement in reasonable reliance upon the 
acceptance, the Court should rule that the Kays have bound themselves to the Agreement by 
silently (in the case of Joy and Teresa Kay) or actively (in the case of Lawrence and Robert 
Kay) manifesting their intent to be bound thereby. 
B. The Court Should Enforce the Settlement Agreement By Ordering 
Specific Performance. 
Utah Courts have uniformly held that "Specific performance is a remedy of 
equity which is addressed to the sense of justice and good conscience of the Court. . . ." 
Morris v. Svkes. 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981). Se also Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374, 
1377 (Utah 1980); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979); and LHIW, Inc. v. 
DeLorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). Utah courts have also held that "Before specific 
performance will be employed by the courts to enforce a contract the terms of the agreement 
must be reasonably certain so the parties know what is required of them, and definite enough 
that the courts can delineate the intent of the contracting parties." Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d 
1374, 1377 (Utah 1980). See also Eliason v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1980). 
In the present case, the elements necessary for specific performance are clearly 
present. First, with respect to justice and fairness, only Southwick has clean hands. 
Lawrence and Robert Kay unconditionally accepted the settlement offer. Is specific 
performance unfair as to them? Absolutely not! Lawrence and Robert Kay should be held to 
the agreement they accepted. 
The Kays' attorney could possibly have been careless in assuming that 
Lawrence and Robert Kay spoke for their wives. If this is true, who should bear the burden 
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of this carelessness? Is it fair for Southwick to be denied the benefit of his settlement 
agreement because the Kays' attorney may have been careless in confirming the authority of 
his clients before he sent out the unconditional acceptance upon which Southwick relied? 
Absolutely not! If anyone should have to bear the burden of anything an attorney does in an 
inappropriate way, the clients who selected the attorney should bear the burden. They are 
the only ones who would then have recourse against their attorney to recoup their loss. 
Furthermore, only they and their attorney know whose fault it was that their attorney was 
positive that all his clients were accepting the offer. Southwick has no way of knowing 
whether Joy and Teresa Kay ever accepted the offer or whether they just changed their 
minds, as the Kays' attorney represented to Southwick's counsel on June 20, 1995. (R. at 
2652) (Addendum B, p. 3). 
Is it fair to allocate the fault upon Joy and Teresa Kay when they may be 
telling the truth that they never accepted the settlement offer? Absolutely! Even if they did 
not verbally accept the settlement offer, their silence and inaction under these unique 
circumstances manifests an acceptance of the settlement offer irrespective of what their intent 
truly was. 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts at §§ 28, 29 and 103. Only Southwick is an innocent 
victim in the Kays' attempt to renege on their acceptance of the settlement offer. Fairness 
dictates, therefore, that Southwick should be protected from the damage caused by not 
finding the formation of and enforcing the Agreement. 
From a public policy standpoint, enforcing the Agreement is the only remedy 
that preserves the fairness of the legal system. If the Agreement is not enforced, a message 
will be sent to clever clients and attorneys who may use the Kays' method of accepting and 
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then rejecting settlement offers in order to find out whether and to what extent the opposing 
party can assemble financial resources. In very few settlements are the acceptances of 
settlement offers made by all accepting parties directly to the offering parties. Typically, 
offers and acceptances are transmitted through attorneys. Consequently, a majority of 
settlement offers could be rejected after being unconditionally accepted by the attorney and 
all but one of his clients and after the offering party has performed in reliance upon the 
acceptance. 
From a public policy standpoint, it would be much fairer to hold the party 
responsible whose attorney incorrectly assumed there was authority to settle. If the clients 
led their attorney astray, the clients deserve to be held responsible. If the attorney was 
careless in confirming authority, the clients have recourse against their attorney. When you 
add to this the fact that Joy and Teresa Kay failed to respond in good faith if they did not 
want to accept the settlement offer and the fact that Southwick reasonably relied upon an 
unconditional acceptance in performing his duties under the Agreement, then it is easy to see 
that equity and fairness mandate the enforcement of the Agreement through specific 
performance. 
The second element necessary for specific performance is reasonable certainty 
as to the terms of the Contract being enforced. Once again, the present case is well suited 
for this remedy. The written offer and its acceptance without conditions or modifications is 
an excellent indication of what the parties agreed to do. Southwick would pay $10,200.00 
and the Kays would release Southwick of any further liability and would file a Satisfaction of 
Judgment as to Southwick. (R. at 2657) (Addendum B, Exhibit B). 
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In addition to the written offer and acceptance, Southwick's attorney prepared 
the Agreement which incorporated the settlement offer and other typical language contained 
in a settlement agreement. The Agreement was fully acceptable to the Kays' attorney, who 
sent it to his clients for signing. (R. at 2671) (Addendum C. p. 3). For this reason, it 
would also be appropriate for the Court to adopt the Agreement as the full terms to be 
enforced. Because the terms of the Agreement are specific and easy to identify, specific 
performance can appropriately be applied in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a valid and binding contract was formed between Southwick and 
the Kays. The terms of the contract are simple and easy to identify. Fairness dictates that 
the contract be enforced through the application of specific performance. In fairness to 
Southwick and the judicial system as a whole, the Kays should not be allowed to slip out of 
their acceptance of the contract by claiming their attorney had no authority to act on behalf 
of Joy and Teresa Kay. 
Because the Court is reviewing the legal conclusions of the Trial Court, no 
particular deference should be given to the Trial Court's conclusions; and for the reasons 
stated herein, the Trial Court's ruling should be overturned, Southwick's motion to enforce 
the Agreement should be granted, and the Agreement should be enforced through specific 
performance. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _Z_ day of July, 1996. 
SCALLEY & READING 
Ma won L. Bates 
Attorney for Val E. Southwick 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the _Z_ day of July, 1996, I caused to be hand-
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following: 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
PO Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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ADDENDUM A 
Defendant Val E. Southwick's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY Sc READING 
Attorneys for Defendant Val E. Southwick 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, ROBERT 
L. KAY and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants 
DEFENDANT VAL E.SOUTHWICK'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 9209061660 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant, Val E. Southwick, hereby moves the Court for 
an Order to enforce the settlement agreement entered into between 
Val E. Southwick and the plaintiffs on April 7, 1995. This Motion 
is supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and the 
Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates, which are filed concurrently 
herewith. 
DATED this 7- day of August, 1995. 
SCALLEY & READING 
'&A. 
Marlon L. Bates 




I hereby certify that on the JJ$ day of August, 1995, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Defendant Val E. Southwick's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
by United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
K&MAPAAU ^JjCiPMtfll^ 
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ADDENDUM B 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant 
Val E. Southwick's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Defendant Val E. Southwick 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, ROBERT 
L. KAY and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT VAL E. SOUTHWICK'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 9209061*60 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
On September 3, 1993, a judgment was entered against Val 
E. Southwick ("Southwick") and others in the above referenced 
matter. On March 16, 1995, Southwick, through his attorney, Marlon 
L. Bates, transmitted by facsimile to the plaintiffs' counsel of 
record a written offer to pay the plaintiffs the sum of $9,180.00 
to satisfy their judgment against Southwick. A copy of said offer 
is attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
Within 30 minutes after the written offer was transmitted 
to the plaintiffs' counsel, Southwick informed his attorney that he 
C.\MLB\PIEADINC\KAY.M£M 
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could offer $10,200.00 in exchange for a satisfaction of the 
judgment against him. Southwick's attorney immediately prepared a 
new written offer to pay $10,200.00 in exchange for a satisfaction 
of judgment and transmitted the written offer by facsimile to the 
plaintiffs' attorney. A copy of the offer is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit B" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
On April 7, 1995, plaintiffs' attorney mailed a written 
acceptance of the offer to settle for $10,200.00. The written 
acceptance was received by Southwick's attorney on April 10, 1995. 
A copy of the written acceptance is attached hereto as "Exhibit C" 
and incorporated herein by this reference. 
In reliance upon the settlement agreement created by the 
plaintiffs' acceptance of Southwick's offer, Southwick transferred 
settlement funds into his attorney's trust account and Southwick's 
attorney prepared a written Settlement and Release Agreement. On 
April 18, 1995, the agreement was mailed to the plaintiffs' 
attorney for review with a cover letter explaining that the 
settlement payment could be made when the language of the written 
agreement was finalized. A copy of the agreement and cover letter 
are attached hereto as "Exhibit D" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
On May 9, 1995, Southwick's attorney spoke to the 
plaintiffs' attorney by telephone regarding the Settlement and 
Release Agreement. The plaintiffs' attorney told Southwick's 
C:\MLB\PIXADINC\KAY.MEM /-\ s\ Q, f* r* -4 
attorney that he was satisfied with the language in the Settlement 
and Release Agreement and had sent it on to his clients for their 
signatures. 
On May 23, 1995, Southwick's attorney left a telephone 
message for the plaintiffs' attorney to call him regarding whether 
the plaintiffs had signed the Settlement and Release Agreement. 
On June 20, 1995, Southwick's attorney spoke to the 
plaintiffs' attorney regarding the status of the Settlement and 
Release Agreement. The plaintiffs' attorney informed Southwick's 
attorney that his clients may have changed their minds with respect 
to the settlement agreement. Southwick's attorney asked the 
plaintiffs' attorney to inform his clients that he believed they 
could not lawfully rescind their settlement agreement and that a 
motion would be brought to enforce the settlement agreement if they 
did not sign and return the Settlement and Release Agreement. The 
plaintiffs' attorney said' he would convey this message to his 
clients. 
On July 11, 1995, Southwick's attorney mailed a written 
notice to the plaintiffs' counsel informing him that if the 
Settlement and Release Agreement was not signed and returned by 
July 21, 1995, a motion would be filed to enforce the agreement 
between the parties. A copy of said notice is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit E" and incorporated herein by this reference. No response 
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to this notice was ever received and the plaintiffs have not signed 
or returned the Settlement and Release Agreement. 
APPLICATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
An agreement to settle is a contract between the parties 
to the agreement. 15A Am.Jur.2d Compromise and Settlement, §7 
(1976) . Like other contracts, it requires offer, acceptance and 
consideration to formulate and once formed, it is fully 
enforceable. Id. In the present case, a written offer to 'pay 
$10,200.00 in consideration of the receipt of a satisfaction of 
judgment was transmitted to the plaintiffs' attorney. The offer 
was unconditionally accepted in writing on April 7, 1995, which 
created a fully enforceable settlement agreement. After Southwick 
transferred funds and Southwick's attorney prepared and delivered 
the Settlement and Release Agreement for execution in reliance upon 
the agreement, the plaintiffs simply changed their minds and 
decided not to go through with what they agreed to do. In doing 
so, the plaintiffs materially breached the agreement. 
There are typically three remedies available when a 
settlement agreement has been breached: (1) enforcement of -the 
agreement; (2) treating the agreement as rescinded; and (3) 
damages. Id. at §35. In the present case, it would be fair for 
the Court to enforce the agreement by ordering the plaintiffs to 
deliver to Southwick a Satisfaction of Judgment upon the receipt of 
the $10,200.00 agreed upon. It would also be fair to award damages 
C:\MIB\PI£/.D!NG\KAY.MEM 4 
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by requiring the plaintiffs to pay Southwick's attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement. 
For the reasons stated above, Southwick requests an Order 
directing the plaintiffs to deliver to Southwick a proper 
Satisfaction of Judgment upon the receipt of the sum of $10,200.00 
and requiring plaintiffs to pay Southwick's attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in enforcing the settlement agreement. 
DATED this Z 'day of August, 1995. 
SCALLEY Sc READING 
ITU 
Marlon' L. Bates 
Attorneys for Val E. Southwick 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 19 95, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Val E. 
Southwick's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement by United States 
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
^JMiMul/. ^JU)\AZ\\ 
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EXHIBIT A 
FORD G. SCALLEY 
J . BRUCE READING 
STEVEN K. WALKENHORST 
MICHAEL W. SPENCE 
MARLON L. BATES 
J O H N EDWARD HANSEN* 
SCOTT N. RASMUSSEN 
J O H N E. SWALLOW** 
STEVEN B. SMITH 
WESLEY D. HUTCHINS 
J A M E S W. CLAFLIN JR.»»* 
• A L S O ADMfTTEO IN WYOMING 
• •ALSO ADMITTED IN COLORADO 
• • • A L S O ADMITTED IN ARIZONA 
LAW O F F I C E S 
SCALLEY & READING 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
SUITE 2 0 0 
261 EAST 3 0 0 SOUTH 
S A L T LAKE CITY, U T A H S4HI 
March 16 , 1995 
TELEPHONE 
AREA CODE SOI 
531-7870 
FACSIMILE 
AREA CODE SOI 
5 3 1 - 7 9 6 8 
VIA FACSIMILE 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
Re: Kay v. Val Southwick 
Dear Mr. Howard: 
As you are well aware, Mr. Southwick's financial situation is 
ideal for a "no asset" chapter 7 bankruptcy. In fact, I have been 
urging him to file bankruptcy for quite some time now. In addition 
to the substantial judgment now on appeal, there are many other 
judgment creditors who are making his life miserable with 
collection efforts. 
Rather than discharging the Kay's judgment in bankruptcy, Val 
has authorized me to offer the sum of $9,180.00 in full 
satisfaction of the judgment against Val Southwick. This offer is 
contingent on Val's ability to borrow this amount from his friends 
or family. While the prospects of this appear good, it has not 
been finalized yet and I do not want to mislead you into believing 
that it can be positively accomplished. 
I realize that the offer is only a fraction of the amount owed 
on the judgment, but it is two or three times the amount necessary 
to complete a chapter 7 bankruptcy and it may help defray the cost 
the Kays are currently incurring on the appeal. Thank you for your 
consideration of this offer and I look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
SCALLEY Sc READING 
a d a 
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EXHIBIT B 
FORD G. SCALLEY 
J . BRUCE READING 
STEVEN K.WALKENHORST 
MICHAEL W. SPENCE 
MARLON L. BATES 
J O H N EOWARO HANSEN* 
SCOTT N. RASMUSSEN 
J O H N E. SWALLOW • • 
STEVEN B. SMITH 
WESLEY D. HUTCHINS 
JAMES W. CLAFLIN JR.»»% 
• A L S O ADMITTED IN WYOMING 
• •ALSO ADMITTED IN COLORADO 
• • • A L S O AOMITTED IN ARIZONA 
LAW OFFICES 
SCALLEY & READING 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SUITE 2 0 0 
261 EAST 3 0 0 SOUTH 
S A L T LAKE CITY, U T A H 84IU 
March 16 , 1995 
TELEPHONE 
AREA CODE SOI 
531-7870 
FACSIMILE 
AREA CODE SOI 
5 3 1 - 7 9 6 8 
VIA FACSIMILE 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
Re: Kay v. Val Southwick 
Dear Mr. Howard: 
Val just received the copy of the letter I faxed to you 20 
minutes ago and he tells me that he believes that he can borrow 
$10,200.00 instead of $9,180.00. Consequently, I am now authorized 
to offer $10,200.00 in full satisfaction of the judgment against 
Val Southwick, subject to Mr. Southwick's ability to borrow this 
amount. 
Sincerely, 
SCALLEY 8c READING 




Don R. Petersen 
Craig M. Snyder 
John L. Valentine 
D. David Lambert 
Fred D. Howard 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
File No. 18,080 
April 7, 1995 
Marlon L. Bates, Esq. 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Kay v. Val Southwick 
Dear Marlon: 
Richard W. Daynes 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Kenneth Parkinson 
OF COUNSEL 
S. Rex Lewis 
| r i l i i T T D ) 
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Kays have authorized us to accept Val Southwick's offer of $10,200.00 in full satisfaction 
of the judgment against him. 
Sincerely, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
LWS/lo 
cc: Lawrence Kay 
Robert Kay 




F O R D G. SCALLEY 
J . BRUCE READING 
STEVEN K. WALKENHORST 
MICHAEL W. SPENCE 
MARLON L. BATES 
J O H N EDWARD HANSEN* 
SCOTT N. RASMUSSEN 
J O H N E. SWALLOW ••• 
STEVEN S. SMITH 
WESLEY D. HUTCHINS 
J A M E S W. CLAFLIN JR.»«* 
* A L S O AOMfTTED JN WXO**i**G 
• • A L S O ADMITTED »N COLORADO 
• • • A L S O ADMITTED IN ARIZONA 
LAW OFFICES 
SCALLEY & READfNG 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SUITE 2 0 0 
261 EAST 3 0 0 SOUTH 
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H 84UI 
A p r i l 18 , 1995 
TELEPHONE 
AREA CODE 801 
531-7870 
FACSIMILE 
AREA CODE SOI 
5 3 1 - 7 9 6 8 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Kay v. Val Southwick 
Dear Leslie: 
I am enclosing a proposed Settlement and Release Agreement for 
your review. The duty of confidentiality is very important to Mr. 
Southwick because he has several creditors who are seeKing 
payments. Please let me know if any changes need to be made. The 
payment can be arranged as soon as the agreement is finalized. 
Sincerely, 
SCALLEY St READING 
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SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made this day of April, 1995 by and 
among Lawrence C. Kay, Joy Kay, Robert L. Kay and Teresa Kay 
(hereinafter collectively "the Kays") and Val E. Southwick 
("Southwick"). 
Recitals 
A. WHEREAS, on or about September 3, 19 93, the Kays 
received a judgment in the amount of $652,347.00 against Southwick 
("the Judgment") and others in that certain lawsuit in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah which is 
identified as Civil No. 920906160 ("the Lawsuit"); and 
B. WHEREAS, the Kays and Southwick have determined that 
it is in their best interest to resolve the Judgment in the manner 
described herein rather than by continuing costly and time 
consuming litigation or debt collection procedures. 
Agreement 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, and the 
mutual covenants and duties contained herein, the Kays and 
Southwick agree as follows: 
1. Southwick shall cause the sum of $10,200.00 to be 
paid jointly to the Kays and their attorneys, HOWARD, LEWIS & 
PETERSON, upon the execution of this Agreement. 
2. The Kays shall accept the sum of $10,200.00 as 
payment in full of the Judgment against Southwick. It is the 
intention of the Kays and Southwick that once the amount of 
$10,200.00 has been received by the Kays through their attorneys, 
then no further amounts will be owed by Southwick to the Kays and 
the Kays shall promptly file a Satisfaction of Judgment which 
releases and discharges the Judgment as to Southwick. Upon receipt 
of the payment described herein, the Kays shall further file any 
documents necessary to release and discharge any abstracts of the 
Judgment as it relates to Southwick which may have been docketed in 
any other court. 
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3. The Kays agree to preserve the confidentiality of 
the terms of this Agreement and the amount which Southwick has 
caused to be paid hereunder. Accordingly, the Kays agree that they 
will not disclose the terms of this Agreement or the amount 
received hereunder to any third party (except the Kays' attorneys, 
accountants, the Internal Revenue Service and any other 
governmental agency to which disclosure is required by law) unless 
required to do so by court order. The Kays understand that if this 
duty of confidentiality is breached, it could cause substantial 
damage to Southwick and Southwick would have the right to recover 
such damage from whomever breaches the duty of confidentiality. 
4. This Agreement does not affect any judgment or 
ongoing litigation between the Kays and Summit Systems, Inc. or the 
other defendants in the Lawsuit and these parties are explicitly 
excluded from this Agreement; the Kays shall have all of the rights 
and remedies against these parties which the Kays had before this 
Agreement was entered into, including but not limited to those 
which the Kays are pursuing before the Utah Supreme Court in Case 
No. 930626. 
5. Once the Kays, through their attorneys, have 
received the sum of $10,200.00, the Kays hereby fully, completely 
and forever discharge and release Southwick and his agents and 
attorneys from all claims, demands, obligations, liabilities, 
indebtedness, breaches of duty, acts, omission, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, nonfeasance, causes of action, sums of money, 
accounts, compensation, contracts, controversies, promises, 
damages, costs, losses, and expenses of every type, kind, nature, 
description or character which relate in any manner whatsoever to 
the Judgment, and irrespective of how, why or by reason of what 
facts, whether heretofore existing or which could be claimed to 
exist, of whatever kind, whether known or unknown, suspected or 
unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated, each as though fully set 
forth herein at length arising out of any event occurring or matter 
existing at or prior to the time of this Agreement which relate in 
any manner whatsoever to the Judgment, save and except the duties 
required by this Agreement. 
6. Once the release described in paragraph 5 above 
becomes effective, Southwick hereby fully, completely and forever 
discharges and releases the Kays and their respective agents and 
attorneys from all claims, demands, obligations, liabilities, 
indebtedness, breaches of duty, acts, omission, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, nonfeasance, causes of action, sums of money, 
accounts, compensation, contracts, controversies, promises, 
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damages, costs, losses, and expenses of every type, kind, nature, 
description or character which relate in any manner whatsoever to 
the Judgment, and irrespective of how, why or by reason of what 
facts, whether heretofore existing or which could be claimed to 
exist, of whatever kind, whether known or unknown, suspected or 
unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated, each as though fully set 
forth herein at length arising out of any event occurring or matter 
existing at or prior to the time of this Agreement which relate in 
any manner whatsoever to the Judgment, save and except the duties 
required by this Agreement. 
7. The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that good 
and valuable consideration has been given for the covenants and 
agreements set forth herein and that each party has been fully 
advised (to the extent they have deemed necessary) by competent 
legal counsel. 
8. The parties agree that nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to be a waiver of claims, rights, interest, 
remedies, or causes of action which arise as of a result of acts, 
inaction, representations, warranties, agreements or covenants 
which have their origin on a date subsequent to this Agreement. 
9. Should any party hereto default in any of the 
promises or agreements contained herein or seek to enforce any 
claim released by this Agreement, the non-defaulting or released 
party, as applicable, shall have the right to enforce the terms 
hereof and the cost of such enforcemer.z, including but not limited 
to reasonable attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by the 
defaulting or releasing party, as applicable, and shall be payable 
upon demand. 
10. The terms of this Agreement and all rights and 
obligations of the parties hereto shall be governed by the laws of 
the state of Utah. 
11. This Agreement may be executed in any number of 
counterparts by the parties hereto and all counterparts together 
shall constitute a single agreement. This Agreement may be 
executed on facsimile copies of the original and each party so 
executing agrees to provide an original executed counterpart as 
soon thereafter as is reasonable. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their hand below 




Robert L. Kay 
Teresa Kay 
Val E. Southwick 
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EXHIBIT E 
F O R D G. S C A L L E Y 
J B R U C E R E A D I N G 
S T E V E N K. W A L K E N M O R S T 
M I C H A E L W. S P E N C E 
M A R L O N L. B A T E S 
J O H N E D W A R D H A N S E N * 
S C O T T N . R A S M U S S E N 
J O H N E. S W A L L O W * * 
S T E V E N B. S M I T H 
W E S L E Y D. H U T C H I N S 
J A M E S W. C L A F L I N J R . * * * 
' A L S O ADMITTED IN WYOMING 
• ' A L S O ADMITTED IN COLORADO 
• • ' A L S O AOMITTED IN ARIZONA 
L A W O F F I C E S 
S C A L L E Y & R E A D I N G 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
S U I T E 2 0 0 
2 6 1 E A S T 3 0 0 S O U T H 
S A L T L^KE: C ITY, U T A H S4.HI 
J u l y 1 1 , 1995 
TELEPHONE 
AREA CODE SOI 
531-7870 
FACSIMILE 
AREA CODE SO! 
S 3 I - 7 9 6 S 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Kay v. Val Southwick 
Dear Leslie: 
This letter will notify you that if your clients have not 
signed and returned the Settlement and Release Agreement on or 
before July 21, 1995, I will bring a motion to enforce the 
agreement. I appreciate any assistance you can give in completing 
this settlement without litigation. 
Sincerely, 
SCALLEY & READING 
Marlon L. Bates 
ada 
cc : Val Southwick 
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ADDENDUM C 
Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates 
MARLON L. BATES, #4 794 
SCALLEY &. READING 
Attorneys for Defendant Val E. Southwick 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, ROBERT : AFFIDAVIT OF 
L. KAY and TERESA KAY, MARLON L. BATES 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a Civil No. 9209061060 CV 
corporation, et al., : 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Marlon L. Bates, having been duly sworn, depose and 
state as follows: 
1. I am over eighteen years of age, am a resident of 
Davis County, Utah, and have personal knowledge of the facts 
asserted herein. 
2. I am a member of the Utah State Bar and have been 
retained to represent the defendant, Val E. Southwick 
("Southwick"), with respect to the judgment entered against him on 
September 3, 1993. 
c \MLB\PLEADING\KAY AFF 
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3. On March 16, 1995, I transmitted by facsimile to the 
plaintiffs' attorney of record a written offer to pay the sum of 
$9,180.00 in exchange for a Satisfaction of Judgment. A copy of 
said offer is attached hereto as "Exhibit A" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
4. Within 3 0 minutes after transmitting the written 
offer to the plaintiffs' attorney, I was informed by Southwick that 
I could offer the sum of $10,200.00 in exchange for a Satisfaction 
of Judgment. 
5. After being notified of the increase in the 
settlement offer, I immediately prepared a new settlement offer 
which set forth the increased settlement amount of $10,200.00 'and 
transmitted it by facsimile to the plaintiffs' attorney. A copy of 
the revised offer of settlement is attached hereto as "Exhibit B" 
and incorporated herein by this reference. 
6. On April 7, 1995, the plaintiffs' attorney mailed a 
written acceptance of the offer to exchange the sum of $10,200.00 
for a Satisfaction of Judgment. The written acceptance was 
received by me on April 10, 1995. A copy of the written acceptance 
is attached hereto as "Exhibit C" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
7. In reliance upon the settlement agreement, I 
arranged to have the settlement funds transferred to my law firm's 
trust account and I prepared a written Settlement and Release 
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Agreement and mailed it to the plaintiffs' attorney on April 18, 
1995, with a letter explaining that the settlement payment would be 
made once the exact form of the agreement was finalized. A copy of 
the Settlement and Release Agreement and the cover letter is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit D" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
8. On May 9, 1995, I spoke by telephone with the 
plaintiffs' attorney regarding the Settlement and Release 
Agreement. The plaintiffs' attorney told me that he was satisfied 
with the language in the Settlement and Release Agreement and had 
sent it to his clients for their signatures. 
9. On May 23, 1995, I left a telephone message with the 
plaintiffs' attorney to call me regarding the status of the 
Settlement and Release Agreement. 
10. On June 20, 1995, I spoke by telephone to the 
plaintiffs' attorney, who told me that his client may have change 
their minds with respect to the settlement agreement. I asked the 
plaintiffs' attorney to tell his clients that I did not think they 
could legally rescind the settlement agreement and I would file a 
motion to enforce the settlement agreement if they did not sign and 
return the Settlement and Release Agreement. The plaintiffs' 
attorney said he would convey my message to his clients. 
11. On July 11, 1995, I mailed a written notice to the 
plaintiffs' attorney informing him that if the Settlement and 
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Release Agreement was not signed and returned by July 21, 1995, a 
motion would be filed to enforce the settlement agreement. A copy 
of said notice is attached hereto as "Exhibit E" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. I have received no response to fehis 
notice and the plaintiffs have not signed and returned the 
Settlement and Release Agreement. 
DATED this J ^ day of August, 1995. 
/7\OAL 
Marlon L. Bates 
I 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this £*£ day of 
August, 1995. 
Notary Public • 
ANNALYSE ANDERSON | 
261E300S. Ste.200 i 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 • 
4 V A * ™ > W ^ Commission Expires • J W J 2 5 7 August1f1&98 I I ^ V ^ j ^ StSTofUtah J 
Notary PJbblic 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
/L/'4 I hereby certify that on the ^ 1> day of August, 1995, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates by United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS S, PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 






FORD G. SCALLEY 
J . 3RUCE READING 
STEVEN K. WALKENHORST 
MICHAEL W. SPENCE 
MARLON L. BATES 
J O H N EDWARD HANSEN* 
SCOTT N. RASMUSSEN 
J O H N E. SWALLOW** 
STEVEN B. SMITH 
WESLEY D. HUTCHINS 
J A M E S W. CLAFLIN JR.»»* 
• A L S O ADMITTED IN WYOMING 
• • A L S O ADMITTED tN COLORADO 
• • • A L S O ADMITTED IN ARIZONA 
LAW OFFICES 
SCALLEY & READING 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SUITE: 200 
2 6 1 EAST 3 0 0 SOUTH 
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H 84111 
March 16, 1995 
TELEPHONE 
AREA CODE SOI 
531-7870 
FACSIMILE 
AREA CODE 8 0 I 
531-7968 
VIA FACSIMILE 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Kay v. Val Southwick 
Dear Mr. Howard: 
As you are well aware, Mr. Southwick's financial situation is 
ideal for a "no asset" chapter 7 bankruptcy. In fact, I have been 
urging him to file bankruptcy for quite some time now. In addition 
to the substantial judgment now on appeal, there are many other 
judgment creditors who are making his life miserable with 
collection efforts. 
Rather than discharging the Kay's judgment in bankruptcy, Val 
has authorized me to offer the sum of $9,180.00 in full 
satisfaction of the judgment against Val Southwick. This offer is 
contingent on Val's ability to borrow this amount from his friends 
or family. While the prospects of this appear good, it has not 
been finalized yet and I do not want to mislead you into believing 
that it can be positively accomplished. 
I realize that the offer is only a fraction of the amount owed 
on the judgment, but it is two or three times the amount necessary 
to complete a chapter 7 bankruptcy and it may help defray the cost 
the Kays are currently incurring on the appeal. Thank you for your 
consideration of this offer and I look forward to hearing from you. 
Sincerely, 
SCALLEY & READING 
Marlon L. Bates 
ada 
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EXHIBIT B 
FORD G. SCALLEY 
J . 3RUCE READING 
STEVEN K. WALKENHORST 
MICHAEL W. SPENCE 
MARLON L. BATES 
J O H N EDWARD HANSEN* 
SCOTT N. RASMUSSEN 
J O H N E. SWALLOW** 
STEVEN B. SMITH 
WESLEY D. HUTCHINS 
JAMES W. CLAFLIN JR .—* 
•ALSO ADMITTED IN WYOMING 
• • A L S O ADMITTED IN COLORADO 
• • • A L S O AOMITTED IN ARIZONA 
LAW OTFICES 
SCALLEY & READING 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
SUITE 2 0 0 
2 6 ! E A S T 3 0 0 S O U T H 
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H 84111 
March 16, 1995 
TELEPHONE 
AREA CODE eoi 
S3I -7870 
FACSIMILE 
AREA CODE 801 
5 3 1 - 7 9 6 8 
VIA FACSIMILE 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Kay v. Val Southwick 
Dear Mr. Howard: 
Val just received the copy of the letter I faxed to you 20 
minutes ago and he tells me that he believes that he can borrow 
$10,200.00 instead of $9,180.00. Consequently, I am now authorized 
to offer $10,200.00 in full satisfaction of the judgment against 
Val Southwick, subject to Mr. Southwick's ability to borrow this 
amount. 
Sincerely, 
SCALLEY 8c READING 
a d a 
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EXHIBIT C 
Jackson Howard 
Don R. Petersen 
Craig M. Snyder 
John L. Valentine 
D. David Lambert 
Fred D. Howard 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo, Utah S4603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
File No. 18.080 
Richard W. Daynes 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Kenneth Parkinson 
OF COUNSEL 
S. Rex Lewis 
April 7, 1995 J3TF|TT;i! 
APR ! 01995 
Marlon L. Bates, Esq. 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Kay v. Val South wick 
Dear Marlon: 
Kays have authorized us to accept Val Southwick's offer of $10,200.00 in full satisfaction 
of the judgment against him. 
Sincerely, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
LWS/lo 





FORD G. SCALLEY 
J . BRUCE READING 
STEVEN K.WALKENHORST 
MICHAEL W. SPENCE 
MARLON L. BATES 
J O H N EDWARD HANSEN-
SCOTT N. RASMUSSEN 
J O H N E. SWALLOW • «• 
STEVEN B. SMITH 
WESLEY D. HUTCHINS 
J A M E S W. CLAFLIN JR .—* 
• ALSO ADMITTED IN WYOMING 
• •ALSO ADMITTED IN COLORAOO 
• • A L S O ADMITTED IN ARIZONA 
LAW O F F I C E S 
SCALLEY & READING 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L CORPORATION 
SUITE 2 0 0 
261 EAST 3 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84in 
A p r i l 18 , 1995 
TELEPHONE 
AREA CODE SO 
531-7670 
FACSIMILE 
AREA CODE SO 
531-7968 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Kay v. Val Southwick 
Dear Leslie: 
I am enclosing a proposed Settlement and Release Agreement for 
your review. The duty of confidentiality is very important to Mr. 
Southwick because he has several creditors who are seeking 
payments. Please let me know if any changes need to be made. The 
payment can be arranged as soon as the agreement is finalized. 
Sincerely, 
SCALLEY & READING 
74^-^4f 
Marlin L. Bates 
ada 
Enclosure 
c \MLE\LTRS\SLAUCH.I£S 00°677 
SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made this day of April, 1995 by and 
among Lawrence C. Kay, Joy Kay, Robert L. Kay and Teresa Kay 
(hereinafter collectively "the Kays") and Val E. Southwick 
("Southwick"). 
Recitals 
A. WHEREAS, on or about September 3, 1993, the Kays 
received a judgment in the amount of $652,347.00 against Southwick 
("the Judgment") and others in that certain lawsuit in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah which is 
identified as Civil No. 920906160 ("the Lawsuit"); and 
B. WHEREAS, the Kays and Southwick have determined that 
it is in their best interest to resolve the Judgment in the manner 
described herein rather than by continuing costly and time 
consuming litigation or debt collection procedures. 
Agreement 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, and the 
mutual covenants and duties contained herein, the Kays and 
Southwick agree as follows: 
1. Southwick shall cause the sum of $10,200.00 to be 
paid jointly to the Kays and their attorneys, HOWARD, LEWIS & 
PETERSON, upon the execution of this Agreement. 
2. The Kays shall accept the sum of $10,200.00 as 
payment in full of the Judgment against Southwick. It is the 
intention of the Kays and Southwick that once the amount of 
$10,200.00 has been received by the Kays through their attorneys, 
then no further amounts will be owed by Southwick to the Kays and 
the Kays shall promptly file a Satisfaction of Judgment which 
releases and discharges the Judgment as to Southwick. Upon receipt 
of the payment described herein, the Kays shall further file any 
documents necessary to release and discharge any abstracts of the 
Judgment as it relates to Southwick which may have been docketed in 
any other court. 
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3. The Kays agree to preserve the confidentiality of 
the terms of this Agreement and the amount which Southwick has 
caused to be paid hereunder. Accordingly, the Kays agree that they 
will not disclose the terms of this Agreement or the amount 
received hereunder to any third party (except the Kays' attorneys, 
accountants, the Internal Revenue Service and any other 
governmental agency to which disclosure is required by law) unless 
required to do so by court order. The Kays understand that if this 
duty of confidentiality is breached, it could cause substantial 
damage to Southwick and Southwick would have the right to recover 
such damage from whomever breaches the duty of confidentiality. 
4. This Agreement does not affect any judgment or 
ongoing litigation between the Kays and Summit Systems, Inc. or the 
other defendants in the Lawsuit and these parties are explicitly 
excluded from this Agreement; the Kays shall have all of the rights 
and remedies against these parties which the Kays had before this 
Agreement was entered into, including but not limited to those 
which the Kays are pursuing before the Utah Supreme Court in Case 
No. 930S25. 
5. Once the Kays, through their attorneys, have 
received the sum of $10,200.00, the Kays hereby fully, completely 
and forever discharge and release Southwick and his agents and 
attorneys from all claims, demands, obligations, liabilities, 
indebtedness, breaches of duty, acts, omission, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, nonfeasance, causes of action, sums of money, 
accounts, compensation, contracts, controversies, promises, 
damages, costs, losses, and expenses of every type, kind, nature, 
description or character which relate in any manner whatsoever to 
the Judgment, and irrespective of how, why or by reason of what 
facts, whether heretofore existing or which could be claimed to 
exist, of whatever kind, whether known or unknown, suspected or 
unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated, each as though fully set 
forth herein at length arising out of any event occurring or matter 
existing at or prior to the time of this Agreement which relate in 
any manner whatsoever to the Judgment, save and except the duties 
required by this Agreement. 
6. Once the release described in paragraph 5 above 
becomes effective, Southwick hereby fully, completely and forever 
discharges and releases the Kays and their respective agents and 
attorneys from all claims, demands, obligations, liabilities, 
indebtedness, breaches of duty, acts, omission, misfeasance, 
malfeasance, nonfeasance, causes of action, sums of money, 
accounts, compensation, contracts, controversies, promises, 
C \AtLB\ACTUICMN,T\KAY-SnT ACK 2 
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damages, costs, losses, and expenses of every type, kind, nature, 
description or character which relate in any manner whatsoever to 
the Judgment, and irrespective of how, why or by reason of what 
facts, whether heretofore existing or which could be claimed to 
exist, of whatever kind, whether known or unknown, suspected or 
unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated, each as though fully set 
forth herein at length arising out of any event occurring or matter 
existing at or prior to the time of this Agreement which relate in 
any manner whatsoever to the Judgment, save and except the duties 
required by this Agreement. 
7. The parties hereto acknowledge and agree that good 
and valuable consideration has been given for the covenants and 
agreements set forth herein and that each party has been fully 
advised (to the extent they have deemed necessary) by competent 
legal counsel. 
8. The parties agree that nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to be a waiver of claims, rights, interest, 
remedies, or causes of action which arise as of a result of acts, 
inaction, representations, warranties, agreements or covenants 
which have their origin on a date subsequent to this Agreement. 
9. Should any party hereto default in any of the 
promises or agreements contained herein or seek to enforce any 
claim released by this Agreement, the non-defaulting or released 
party, as applicable, shall have the right to enforce the terms 
hereof and the cost of such enforcement, including but not limited 
to reasonable attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by the 
defaulting or releasing party, as applicable, and shall be payable 
upon demand. 
10. The terms of this Agreement and all rights and 
obligations of the parties hereto shall be governed by the laws of 
the state of Utah. 
11. This Agreement may be executed in any number of 
counterparts by the parties hereto and all counterparts together 
shall constitute a single agreement. This Agreement may be 
executed on facsimile copies of the original and each party so 
executing agrees to provide an original executed counterpart as 
soon thereafter as is reasonable. 
UU^bdU 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their hand below 




Robert L. Kay 
Teresa Kay 
Val E. Southwick 
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EXHIBIT E 
F O R D G. S C A L L E Y 
J B R U C E R E A D I N G 
S T E V E N K. W A L K E N H O R S T 
M I C H A E L W. S P E N C E 
M A R L O N L. B A T E S 
J O H N E D W A R D H A N S E N * 
S C O T T N . R A S M U S S E N 
J O H N E. S W A L L O W " • 
S T E V E N B. S M I T H 
W E S L E Y D. H U T C H I N S 
J A M E S W. C L A F L I N J R . " * 
' A L S O ADMITTED IN WYOMING 
' A L S O AOMITTCO »N COLORADO 
' A L S O ADMITTED IN ARIZONA 
L A W O F F I C E S 
S C A L L E Y & READING 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
S U I T E 2 0 0 
2 6 1 E A S T 3 0 0 S O U T H 
S A L T L A K E C ITY , U T A H S^-in 
J u l y 1 1 , 1995 
T E L E P H O N E 
A R E A C O D E S O I 
S 3 I - 7 S 7 0 
F A C S I M I L E 
A R E A C O D E SOt 
5 3 1 - 7 9 6 3 
L e s l i e W. S l a u g h , E s q . 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 E a s t 300 N o r t h 
PO Box 778 
P r o v o , Utah 8 4 6 0 3 
R e : Kay v . V a l S o u t h w i c k 
D e a r L e s l i e : 
This letter will notify you that if your clients have not 
signed and returned the Settlement and Release Agreement on or 
before July 21, 1995, I will bring a motion to enforce the 
agreement. I appreciate any assistance you can give in completing 
this settlement without litigation. 
Sincerely, 
SCALLEY & READING 
M a r l o n L. B a t e s 
a d a 
c c : V a l S o u t h w i c k 
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ADDENDUM D 
Memorandum in Opposition to Val E. Southwick's Motion to 
Enforce Settlement Agreement 
Our File No. 18,080 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile. (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, 
ROBERT L. KAY and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
VAL E. SOUTHWICK'S MOTION TO 
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Case No. 9209061060CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiffs submit this memorandum in opposition to Val E. Southwick's Motion to 
Enforce Settlement Agreement dated August 2, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Lawrence C. Kay and Joy Kay are husband and wife, and Robert L. Kay and 
Teresa Kay are husband and wife. 
2. Leslie W. Slaugh is attorney for all of the plaintiffs but discussed the proposed 
settlement agreement only with Lawrence Kay and Robert Kay. 
3. Neither Joy Kay nor Teresa Kay ever agreed to the proposed settlement. 
002685 
ARGUMENT 
THE SETTLEMENT WAS NOT APPROVED BY ALL PLAINTIFFS 
AND IS THEREFORE NOT ENFORCEABLE. 
The authority of an attorney to bind his clients is limited. While the attorney has 
control over procedural aspects of the litigation, only the client may consent to a settlement. 
The agency of the attorney is therefore limited. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-32 (1992) expresses 
this limitation: 
An attorney and counselor has authority: 
(2) To bind his client in any of the steps of an action 
or proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk or entered 
upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise. 
The effect of this statute is to void the purported settlement. In McWhirter v. 
Donaldson. 36 Utah 293, 104 P. 731 (1909), the court stated: 
Of such agreement, therefore, there can be no specific 
performance. To allow the court to enforce them, as was 
done in this case, against the will or without the consent of 
the parties, is to allow the court to work the precise mischief 
which the statute was designed to prevent. Instead of being 
nullified in that way, the statute ought to be strictly adhered 
to, for it is the dictation of wisdom. 
104 P. at 734 (quoting Borkheim v. N.B.&M. Ins. Co.. 38 Cal. 623). 
Based upon this authority, there is no settlement agreement for the Court to enforce. 
This is not a case where all of the plaintiffs reviewed the proposed settlement and agreed to it, 
and where their agreement was communicated by their attorney. In this case, two of the 
002686 
plaintiffs never agreed to the proposed settlement. The statute clearly states that they are not 
bound by the actions of their attorney in inadvertently agreeing to the settlement. 
The motion to enforce the settlement should be denied. 
Val South wick also seeks an award of attorney fees for bringing his motion. He cites 
no authority for his request, and the undersigned counsel is aware of none. The request should 
be summarily denied. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a)(1) (motions "shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefor"); Utah Code Jud. Admin. 4-501(1)(a) (motions to be "accompanied by a 
memorandum of points and authorities"); First Security Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Creech. 858 P.2d 
958, 962 (Utah 1993) (court will not consider issues for which the party "presents no analysis 
or reasoning and cites no authority"). 
DATED this _ Z f d a y of August, 1995. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: J 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
00^687 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of August, 1995. 
Marlon L. Bates, Esq. 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 






Affidavit of Leslie W. Slaugh 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 18,080 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, 
ROBERT L. KAY and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LESLIE W. SLAUGH 
Case No. 9209061060CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, being duly sworn, states: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. On or prior to April 6, 1995,1 faxed to Robert Kay and Lawrence Kay, at their 
business office, a copy of Val Southwick's offer to pay $10,200.00 in full satisfaction of the 
judgment against him. 
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3. On April 6, 1995, I had a telephone conversation with Lawrence Kay and 
Robert Kay during which we discussed the proposed settlement. 
4. During the April 6, 1995, telephone conversation, Lawrence Kay and Robert 
Kay told me that they would agree to the proposal. 
5. We did not discuss whether Joy Kay or Teresa Kay had agreed or would agree 
to the proposal, but I assumed that Joy Kay and Teresa Kay had agreed or would agree to the 
proposal. 
6. I had not spoken with either Joy Kay or Teresa Kay concerning the proposed 
settlement prior to mailing my letter to Marlon L. Bates dated April 7, 1995, and did not have 
actual authority from Joy Kay or Teresa Kay to accept the proposal to settle for $10,200.00. 
7. My present understanding is that Joy Kay and Teresa Kay are each unwilling 
to settle their judgment of over $652,347.00 for only $10,200.00. 
8. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
DATED this /T** day of August, 1995. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH ^ f 




I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this /•£* day of August, 1995. 
Marlon L. Bates, Esq. 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 






Affidavit of Joy Kay 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Pruvo, Utah S4603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (SOI) 377^991 
| S C A U £ Y & £ £ ^ 
Our Ftle No. 18,050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, 
ROBERT L. KAY and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC.. a 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOY KAY 
Case No. 9209061060CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UINTAH ) 
JOY KAY, being duly sworn, states: 
1. I am one of the plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. I recall seeing a copy of a letter regarding a proposal that Val South wick would 
pay $10,200.00 in full satisfaction of our judgment against him. 
3. I did not agree to the proposal and informed my husband, Lawrence Kay, that 
I did not want to agree to the proposal. 
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4. I refused to sign the proposed settlement documents because I had not 
previously agreed to the settlement and did not want to agree to the settlement. 
5. I did not authorize my attorney, Leslie W. Slaugh, to state that I had agreed 
to the settlement. 
6. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
DATED this of August, 1995. 
SUBwSCRIRF-D and sworn to before me this /&— day of August, 1995. 
lEawes 8/17/38 
. s i JgSp ' STATC0FJ£TAH
 —
J 
MAILING CER ri^iCATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this /I day of August, 1995. 
Marlon L. Bates. Esq. 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 







Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Val E. Southwick's Motion to 
Enforce Settlement Agreement 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY Sc READING 
Attorneys for Defendant Val E. Southwick 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, ROBERT 
L. KAY and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a 
corporation, et al. , 
Defendants. 
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO VAL E. 
SOUTHWICK'S MOTION TO ENFORCE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 9209061060 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiffs oppose Val E. Southwick's ("Southwick") Motion 
to Enforce the Settlement Agreement on the basis that only two of 
the four plaintiffs accepted the settlement offer and the 
plaintiffs' counsel does not have authority to bind the two 
plaintiffs who did not accept the settlement offer. (See 
Memorandum In Opposition, pp. 1-3.) While it is true that the 
plaintiffs' counsel cannot unilaterally bind unwilling clients, 
this principle alone does not prevent the Court from granting 
Southwick's motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 
Southwick's motion to enforce the settlement agreement is 
a request for specific performance. Utah courts have uniformly 
c \MLB\PLTADINC\KAY KL? 
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held that "Specific performance is a remedy of equity which is 
addressed to the sense of justice and good conscience of the Court, 
and accordingly, considerable latitude of discretion is allowed in 
his determination as to whether it shall be granted and what 
judgment should be entered in respect thereto;" Morris v. Sykes, 
624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981). See also Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d 
1374, 1377 (Utah 1980); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 
1979); and LHIW, Inc. v. De Lorean, 753 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1988). 
With respect to specific performance of a contract, Utah 
courts have held that "Before specific performance will be employed 
by the courts to enforce a contract the terms of the agreement must 
be reasonably certain so the parties know what is required of them, 
and definite enough that the courts can delineate the intent of the 
contracting parties." Reed v. Alvey, 610 P. 2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 
1980). See also Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1980). 
The circumstances of the present case strongly support 
the application of the Court's equitable powers. It is undisputed 
that a written settlement agreement was entered into between 
Southwick and Lawrence C. Kay and Robert L. Kay. Paragraph 4 of 
the Affidavit of Leslie W. Slaugh clearly sets forth the acceptance 
of the written settlement offer by Lawrence C. Kay and Robert L. 
Kay. Mr. Slaugh, who is a very competent and careful attorney, had 
no doubt in his mind after conversing with representatives of both 
couples who comprise the plaintiffs, that all plaintiffs had 
C : \ M I B \ P L E A D I N G \ K A Y . R £ P 2 
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accepted the settlement offer. Mr. Slaugh would not have sent an 
unequivocal written acceptance of the offer unless he believed that 
all four plaintiffs had accepted the offer. 
It is also undisputed that in reliance upon the written 
acceptance of the offer, Southwick moved forward to transfer 
settlement funds and to have his attorney prepare a written 
settlement agreement to describe the settlement in complete detail. 
It is further undisputed that while Southwick was proceeding in 
good faith to comply with the terms of the agreement, the 
plaintiffs did nothing for two and one-half months to advise 
Southwick or his counsel that the unequivocal acceptance of the 
offer was only binding as to Lawrence C. Kay and Robert L. Kay 
because Joy and Teresa Kay did not accept the offer. Although the 
plaintiffs' attorney mailed the acceptance of the offer on April 7, 
1995, it was not until June 20, 1995 that Southwick's attorney 
first received word that the plaintiffs had "changed their minds" 
about the settlement. The plaintiffs allowed two and one-half 
months to pass after their counsel accepted the offer before 
providing Southwick with any notice that there was a problem. And 
this delay occurred even though the plaintiffs knew Southwick was 
diligently performing his duties under the agreement. It was not 
until Southwick's counsel received plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition over four months after the unequivocal acceptance of the 
C Wl.&\PL£ADfNC\KAY UP 3 
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offer that Southwick first learned that Joy and Teresa Kay had not 
been consulted when the settlement offer was originally accepted. 
Because the plaintiffs demonstrated a lack of good faith 
and diligence in the way they proceeded to accept and then 
belatedly reject the settlement offer, because two of the 
plaintiffs undisputedly accepted the offer, and because Southwick 
relied upon the plaintiffs' acceptance of the offer in carrying out 
his duties under the agreement, the Court should exercise its broad 
equitable powers to enforce the settlement agreement. If litigants 
are permitted to wait two and one-half months after their lawyer 
has unequivocally accepted a settlement agreement before providing 
the opposing party with any notice of a problem, and then to slip 
out of the agreement by alleging that not all of them accepted the 
offer, then a tremendous injustice will be condoned and settlement 
agreements will become a tool for the crafty litigant to use to 
find out what his opponent is willing to do or what financial 
resources his opponent can assemble. One side to the litigation 
can always allege after the fact that one of their group did not 
accept the settlement agreement. But when the accepting parties 
are the spouses of the nonaccepting parties and when the plaintiffs 
allow the defendant to continue with his duties under the agreement 
for two and one-half months without ever notifying the defendant 
that there is a problem, then equity requires the plaintiffs to be 
bound to the settlement agreement. 
C:\MLB\PLTADING\>CAY.R.EP 4 
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For the reasons explained above, the Court should grant 
the motion to enforce the settlement agreement as to all four 
plaintiffs. 
DATED this 21st day of August, 1995. 
SCALLEY & READING 
\a/L\ 
Marldn L. Bates 
Attorneys for Val E. Southwick 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of August, 1995, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply 
to Memorandum in Opposition to Val E. Southwick's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement by United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 




Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 18,080 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, 
ROBERT L. KAY and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Case No. 9209061060 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiff submits this memorandum to respond to arguments raised for the first time in 
Val Southwick's Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Val E. Southwick's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement dated August 21, 1995. 
Val Southwick argues that his motion seeks specific performance, which is addressed 
to the equitable powers of the Court. Southwick then attempts to extrapolate a rule that the 
Court can do whatever it deems equitable regardless of whether a contract exists. The law does 
not support this extrapolation. 
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The law relating to settlement agreements was recently summarized by the Utah 
Supreme Court as follows: 
Settlement agreements are favored by law and may 
be summarily enforced if there is a binding settlement 
agreement and the excuse for nonperformance is 
comparatively insubstantial. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. 
Barbara Jensen Interiors. Inc.. 781 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Settlement agreements are governed by the rules 
applied to general contract actions. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 
P.2d 311, 312 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Under the principles 
of basic contract law, a contract is not formed unless there is 
a meeting of the minds. Pingree v. Continental Group of 
Utah. Inc.. 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976). 
Sadder v. Savin. 267 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 24 (June 16, 1995). 
"[T]he existence of a valid contract is essential to the remedy of specific performance. 
In order for equity to decree specific performance, it is necessary that there be in existence and 
in effect a contract valid at law and binding upon the party against whom performance is sought, 
for specific performance is never applicable where there is no obligation to perform." 71 Am. 
Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 13 (1973). Accord. Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 
P.2d 491, 493(1967). 
It is, therefore, irrelevant whether the undersigned counsel thought there was a 
settlement. The fact is that two of the plaintiffs did not agree to the settlement, and counsel did 
not discover that until some weeks after mailing the proposed settlement documents to the 
defendants for signature. The equitable power of this Court to award specific performance 
cannot be invoked in this case, because there was never any contract. 
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Specific performance or other equitable relief is not appropriate in any event. While 
defendant may have arranged for a loan of money, there is no showing that he ha? been legally 
prejudiced. Nothing has occurred which cannot easily be undone. The loaned money can be 
returned. There has not been any reliance which would justify the Court in enforcing a contract 
which was never made, and binding Joy Kay and Teresa Kay to a settlement to which they did 
not agree. 
DATED this 2Jif day of August, 1995. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: O 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of August, 1995. 
Marlon L. Bates, Esq. 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
SECRETARY 
J \LWS\KAY SUP 
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ADDENDUM I 
Response to Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
MARLON L. BATES, #4 794 
SCALLEY & READING __ 
Attorneys for Defendant Val E. Southwick-
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, ROBERT 
L. KAY and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a 
corporation, et al. , 
Defendants. 
RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO ENFORCE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 9209061060 CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement conveniently concludes that 
there is no contract and then recites cases which say that if there 
is no contract, there can be no specific performance to enforce the 
contract. The problem with this line of reasoning is that is 
assumes as fully resolved the very issue to be decided -- the 
existence of a contract. The Kays argue that because the two wives 
did nothing to manifest their consent to the settlement offer which 
their husbands accepted, no contract was formed. But a contract 
can be formed without the express manifestation of the parties: 
"under some circumstances, silence and inaction operate as an 
C \MlB\riEADlNG\kAY R£S 
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acceptance, as where, under the circumstances, an inference of 
assent is warranted .... Under certain circumstances, the offeree 
may authorize or cause the offeror to regard silence as an 
acceptance . . . . " 17A Am. Jur.2d Contracts §103 (1991). "Consent 
may be implied from acts or may be indicated by silence or 
inaction. Conduct may be as effective as words in manifesting 
mutual assent to a contract." 17A Am. Jur.2d Contracts §29 (1991). 
"The meeting of the minds, which is essential in the formation of 
a contract, is not determined by the secret intentions of the 
parties, but by their expressed or manifested intentions, which may 
be wholly at variance with the former." 17A Am. Jur.2d Contracts 
§28 (1991). 
In the present case, while the two husbands 
unconditionally accepted the settlement offer, the two wives did 
absolutely nothing for two and one-half months to advise Southwick 
or his counsel that the unequivocal acceptance of the offer was not 
effective as to the wives. The inaction of the wives during this 
extended period of time while Southwick was relying upon the 
acceptance in performing his duties thereunder is exactly the type 
of silence or inaction that manifests consent irrespective of 
whether there is actual consent. Consequently, a contract was 
formed and fairness dictates that it now be enforced. 
C : \ M L B \ P I E A D I N G \ K A Y . R I S 002*702. 
DATED this 3 0 day of August, 1995. 
SCALLEY Sc READING 
Marlon L. Bates 
Attorney for Defendant Val E. 
Southwick 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ /]t3day of August, 1995, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Response to Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Enforce Settlement Agreement by United States mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
^AMMA&<4( ^bkh)atfV\ 





IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAY, LAWRENCE C 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 920906160 CV 
DATE 09/12/95 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CLB 




AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION DATED AUGUST 16, 1995 AND 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION DATED AUGUST 30, 1995, THE 
COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT, ETC. IS DENIED 
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN THE OPPOSING MEMORANDA. 
2. COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE 
ORDER. 
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Case No: W B B B H I 
Certificate of Mailing 
I cert i fy that on the fa^ day of 4aasi' 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
JACKSON HOWARD 
Atty for Plaintiff 
12 0 EAST 3 00 NORTH 
P O BOX 778 
PROVO UT 84 603 
MARLON L. BATES 
Atty for Defendant 
261 EAST 300 SOUTH 
SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
LESLIE W SLAUGH 
Atty for Plaintiff 
120 EAST 3 00 NORTH 
P 0 BOX 778 
PROVO UT 84603 




Order Denying Val E. Southwick's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, 
ROBERT L. KAY and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING VAL E. 
SOUTHWICK'S MOTION TO 
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Case No. 92O9O610feOCV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Val E. Southwick's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement dated August 2, 1995, 
came regularly before the Court for consideration without oral argument. The Court having 
considered the memoranda and affidavits supporting and opposing the motion, and having 
entered a Minute Entry on September 12, 1995, stating the reasons for the Court's ruling, now 
enters the following: 
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Val E. Southwick's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is denied. 
DATED this /frl&y of September 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
± 
MARLON L. BATES, ESQ. 




Notice of Appeal 
MARLON L. BATES, #4 794 
SCALLEY Sc READING 
Attorneys for Defendant Val E. Southwiek 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, ROBERT : NOTICE OF APPEAL 
L. KAY and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a Civil No. 920906160 CV 
corporation, et al., : 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants. 
Notice is hereby given that Val E. Southwick, a defendant 
in the above-captioned matter, by and through his counsel of 
record, Marlon L. Bates, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the 
entir.e Order Denying Val E. Southwick's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement, which was entered by the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah on October 16, 1995. 
DATED this 15th day of November, 1995. 
SCALLEY & READING 
Marlon, L. Bates 




I hereby certify that on the 15th day of November, 1995, 
I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Appeal by United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed 
to the following: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
PO Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84 603 
c \MLB\PLEADIN,G\KAY NOT 
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